

every decision that we form can without doubt be connected with something that has occurred to us. On the other hand, the theory appears to be equally incapable of proof, for it cannot be shown that the happenings to which it points as having caused our action did not, in fact, merely have the effect of *conditioning* it. I cannot eat *unless* I have teeth; but I do not eat *because* I have teeth, but because I wish to do so. A young man adopts an Indian career after casually reading a book on the Indian Service; if he had not chanced upon the book, he might have lived his life in England. But he goes to India not because he read the book, but because he was disposed to try the new. Had he not possessed this disposition, no book would have moved him; possessing it, he is ready to receive from any source information that enables him to see his way to a career towards which his bent inclines him. It is, then, his disposition, and not the reading of the book, that is the true cause of his resolution: the latter is merely a condition.

But, it will be objected, this argument merely shifts the cause further back: it is his disposition, not a choice of free will, that sends him to India. It is true that we can hardly escape from the sway of our instinctive impulses; but in man these impulses are so conflicting and of so general a character that they leave ample scope for the exercise of free choice in giving play to them.

That we possess a measure of
independance is
shown very clearly by the process of "fixing
our
attention." Our attention may be
attracted
by an object subconsciously. in
which case.
of course, no question of spontaneity
arises.
But it may also be fixed by an effort of
will. We
are conscious, very distinctly indeed, of
possessing
the power of fixing it upon anything that
we please;